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Principles for Reliable Operating Systems. 2002. PJD reminisces about joint work in 1975 with
Roger Needham on design principles for reliable operating systems. He recounts vivid
memories of two findings, about interrupts and about capability addressing. These principles are
still valid a quarter century later and remain in wide use.
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Back in the summer of 1975, Dorothy Denning and I, then still newlyweds, spent
a month at Cambridge.  During that time Roger Needham and I met daily to
discuss topics in the design of operating systems.  We were searching for
fundamental principles for reliable systems.  One fruit of those discussions was
my paper, “Fault tolerant operating systems,” in ACM Computing Surveys,
December 1976.  Two topics of our discussions have stuck in my mind for all
these years because the principles were sound and relevant to real systems.  They
are interrupts and capability addressing.
Interrupts
Roger and I were concerned about the considerable variation in the
interpretations of the purpose and operation of interrupt systems, which had
been a part of operating systems since the Atlas at University of Manchester in
1959.  We saw no clear consensus on their design principles.  The Atlas team
called them interrupts because they were used to interrupt normal processing to
allow calls to operating system functions.  Other operating systems called them
traps -- a metaphorical reference to a mousetrap springing in response to a pre-set
condition.  In describing the Burroughs and Multics operating systems, Elliot
Organick called them unexpected procedure calls.  In their seminal paper,
“Programming semantics for multiprocess computations,” Jack Dennis and Earl
Van Horn (DVH) called them exceptional conditions and linked them to the
protected entry of any routine providing a function for a class of objects.  IBM
referred to interrupts as exceptions. By 1975 several leading language designers
believed that every procedure call, whether to the OS or not, should provide both
a normal return and an exception return.  The common features of these
interpretations were that interrupts gave safe access to supervisory functions of
the operating system, stopped programs that encountered error conditions,
enabled the operating system to divert to high priority functions, and relied on
the procedure calling mechanism.  Roger and I were specifically interested in a
uniform interpretation of interrupt systems that accommodated these common
features and gave clear guidance on how the interrupt hardware and software
should be designed for reliability of the whole operating system.
In a nutshell, our conclusions were:
• Interrupt system is at a low kernel level, just above the procedure
mechanism.
• The interrupt vector, which points to the routines for handling each type
of exception, should encode not only the handler entry points, but their
proper supervisor state and interrupt mask settings.  The procedure
mechanism should set the specified supervisor state and masks on call,
and restore them on return.
• Hardware condition detectors notify the dispatcher of faults and external
device signals.  The detectors for faults could generally be synchronized
with the system clock but the detectors for external conditions could not.
• Failure to realize that external condition signals could occur
simultaneously led to interrupt dispatchers prone to arbitration failures.
The interrupt system itself consisted of detectors, a dispatcher, a mask, and a
vector (list) of interrupt handler routines.  The detectors were hardware devices
that monitored for pre-set conditions and raised a signal when one occurred.
The dispatcher, a combination of hardware and microcode, selected one of the
unmasked, raised conditions and invoked a procedure call on the corresponding
handler.  The mask told which signals to respond to.  The vector listed the
interrupt handler routines.
One of the open questions concerned the placement of the interrupt system in the
functional hierarchy of the operating system.  Following the principle of layering,
which was gaining popularity since Edsger Dijkstra used it successfully in the
THE system, we concluded that the interrupt system belonged in the kernel just
above the procedure mechanism, which was just above the instruction set.  The
interrupt system had to be higher than the procedure mechanism since the
dispatcher calls procedures.  It had to be lower than everything else, since all
other OS functions could define exceptional conditions.
Another open question was how to get the dispatcher to safely enter the CPU
supervisor mode when it invoked an interrupt handler, and restore user mode
upon return.  Entry into the supervisor state had to be coupled tightly to
interrupt dispatching lest a separate mechanism become a back door for
intruders.  We borrowed from the DVH capability idea to describe a clean way to
do this.  The entries in the interrupt vector would encode the entry point address,
the target supervisor mode, and the target interrupt mask.  Procedure call would
load the instruction pointer, mode, and mask registers simultaneously from these
data.  Procedure return would restore the former values.
Still another open question was what kinds of conditions should be handled by
the interrupt system.  Real systems recognized two categories of conditions:
faults and external signals.  A fault condition meant that the running program
could not continue until the detected error was corrected; examples were
memory parity, arithmetic, addressing, protection, illegal instructions.  An
external signal meant that a peripheral device (such as disk) needed an OS action
before a deadline; examples were disk completion, receipt of network packet,
clock interruption.  We did not see any good alternative for separating these two
kinds of conditions.  Yet there was a crucial difference between them.  Errors
could be detected in the CPU between instruction cycles; therefore, the
dispatcher always saw a stable set of error condition signals.  In contrast, external
signals were unconstrained by the CPU clock; therefore, the dispatcher could
witness simultaneously arriving device signals and suffer arbitration failures.
Arbitration failures are a serious threat to reliability.
David Wheeler and other colleagues had documented arbitration failures that
occur when the dispatch circuit is unable to select, within a clock cycle, exactly
one of several simultaneously occurring incoming signals.  Wheeler argued
persuasively that, although the probability of an arbitration failure might appear
small (e.g., 1 in 100,000), it is only a matter of a few days before enough
interrupts have been processed that a failure is nearly certain.  When the failure
occurs, the CPU mysteriously hangs up, losing data and requiring a complete
cold-restart.  Wheeler designed a threshold flipflop (TFF) for the interrupt system
that would pause the CPU clock until the TFF indicated it had reached a
decision, thereby averting the arbitration failure in exchange for an occasional
delay of more than one clock cycle until the TFF correctly registered an interrupt.
Capability Addressing
Roger and I also discussed capability addressing and the structure of capability-
based operating systems.  Invented by Dennis and Van Horn in 1966, capabilities
were long, protected, globally unique addresses for objects.  Robert Fabry built a
prototype capability machine two years later.  Within a few more years the
Plessey Company built the System 250, a telephone switching computer that
used capability addressing; they reported ultra-high reliability, security, and
resistance to software errors.  Roger and his colleagues were in the middle of a
project to build CAP, a general-purpose capability machine and operating
system.  Their own preliminary experiments had suggested that such a system
would be extremely reliable because errors could not spread outside the local
address space in which they occurred.
Roger was extremely worried about the complexity of the CAP operating system.
It appeared that the requirement that capabilities be hardware protected from
alteration could only be met by partitioning the memory of the machine into
separate data and capability parts, which then precipitated a similar partition of
the operating system and its data structures into separate data and capability
parts.  There was a significant problem of maintaining consistency between data
and their corresponding capabilities.  The complexity was further aggravated by
the rigid interpretation of capabilities as “access tickets” for objects.  File owners
seemed to find it more natural to control access to their files with access control
lists than to set up a daemon process to hand out capabilities on request to
qualified users.  Roger and I discussed possible ways to reduce the complexity to
be competitive with other operating systems.
We concluded that the principle of hardware-protected capabilities was the
source of much complexity.  If we could relax that principle, we could preserve
the good features of capability addressing without the cost of special memory or
of partitioning.  One way to do this would be to use type-checking in compilers
to verify that capability arguments passed to system routines were in fact
capabilities.  The integrity of capabilities could be guaranteed if the set of OS
programs that used capabilities (all layers up through the directory level) were
all part of a trusted set assembled and verified by experienced programmers.
This might not prevent a determined hacker from penetrating the kernel and
modifying capabilities, but it would guarantee the proper use of capabilities for
all normal users.  Unfortunately, the CAP hardware was already committed to
memory partitioning and the OS design was too far along for this to be a realistic
option.  Besides, compiler technology had not evolved to the point where the
required type-checking could be trusted.
We also developed a hybrid access-control method that would combine features
of access control lists and access tickets.  We observed that an access control list is
permanent and persists as long as the file exists.  In contrast, a capability list can
be a temporary structure that lasts only as long as the associated computational
process.  After a process is created, its capability list can be loaded (on demand)
with capabilities dynamically constructed from the access lists attached to the
files holding the objects addressed by the process.  This hybrid generalized the
standard virtual memory: the mapping tables contain capabilities constructed on
the fly from access control lists attached to files.  This hybrid was of great interest
both to Roger and to Maurice Wilkes.  But again the CAP project was too far
along to retrofit this.
In their 1979 follow-on book about the CAP operating system, Roger and
Maurice lamented that they were unable to reduce the complexity of the system
enough to make it competitive with more conventional operating systems.  The
main benefit, reliable and secure object addressing and sharing, had too large a
cost.
Was that the end for these ideas?  For designing a system with the reliability of a
capability system at the cost of a conventional system?  Far from it.  These ideas
are the backbone of modern object oriented programming systems.  The
compilers use “handles” to refer to objects -- handles are like software
capabilities -- and type checking to assure that handles are passed only to
functions authorized to receive them.  Objects can be dynamically loaded from
external files, to which conventional access lists control access.  Although these
ideas did not make it in CAP, Roger can nonetheless take pleasure in seeing the
technology he helped to develop become a mainstay in computing.
